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Protecting future generations from climate change requires that we alter this
generation’s investment and consumption decisions. The discount rate trans-
lates future utility or consumption into the same units as current utility or
consumption, thereby making inter-generational comparisons possible. The
discount rate therefore can be important in making recommendations about
current climate policy. The discount rates for utility (the pure rate of time
preference) and for consumption (the social discount rate) are diﬀerent, but
related, objects. I recognize this diﬀerence where it is important, but for
much of the discussion I merely use the term “discount rate”. I provide a
(very selective) overview of several recent discount-related topics in climate
policy, including the magnitude of eﬀects, the extent of intergenerational
conﬂict, the degree to which catastrophic risk overwhelms other considera-
tions, and our perspective on the distant future. In addition to providing a
summary for economists who have not previously encountered one or more
of the issues that I raise, I hope that a uniﬁed discussion of the issues will be
a useful synthesis.
First, I consider the evidence on the importance of the discount rate in
evaluating climate policy (Section 2). The discount rate is especially likely
to be important if protecting future generations from climate change requires
that the current generation make sacriﬁces, not merely reallocate investment
across diﬀerent uses. A somewhat heterodox view is that although reallo-
cation of investment across diﬀerent uses in the current period must occur,
sacriﬁces might not be necessary; in any case, these sacriﬁces have been ex-
aggerated by previous researchers because of a modeling error. To the extent
that this view is correct, the discount rate becomes less important in deter-
mining climate change policy — or at least the focus changes (Section 3).
Section 4 considers the relation between discounting and the desire to
avoid catastrophes. Discount rates and catastrophe-avoidance are logically
distinct topics, but recent papers claim that the risk of catastrophe swamps
any consideration of discounting. I am skeptical of this claim. Section 5
takes up the question of how to treat the distant future in models of the envi-
ronment. I provide a new result showing that spatial perspective is analogous
to hyperbolic discounting, not merely discounting. To the extent that our
picture of the world involves perspective over both space and time, this result
provides another motivation for using hyperbolic discounting in climate pol-
icy models. The ﬁnal section discusses recent modeling developments that
1oﬀer useful new approaches for thinking about the climate problem.
2 How important is the discount rate?
Most economists working on climate policy think that protecting future gen-
erations from climate-related damages will require sacriﬁces by the current
generation, typically in the form of reduced consumption. The hypothesis
that reducing emissions requires a reduction in current consumption, and
the recognition that climate-related damages will likely arise decades or even
centuries in the future, suggests that the discount rate is an important de-
terminant of optimal climate policy.
The comparison between current costs and future beneﬁts in simple set-
tings provides much of our intuition about the sensitivity, to the discount
rate, of optimal climate policy. However, apparently similar settings can
result in much diﬀerent policy levels and policy sensitivity to the discount
rate. A simple example shows that similar models can have quite diﬀer-
ent implications about discounting. After this example, I point out that
m o r ec o m p l e xc l i m a t ec h a n g em o d e l sc a na l s ol e a dt od i ﬀerent views of the
importance of discounting.
In the simple example, suppose that by reducing the ﬂow of utility by x
units per period we can avoid a loss of 100 units of the ﬂow of utility over
(T,∞).I f T is known, we would be willing to give up the ﬂow x = e−ρT100
over (0,∞) w h e nt h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e( P R T P )i sρ.I f T = 200,
x changes by a factor of 55, ranging from 13.5 to 0.25, as ρ ranges from 0.01
to 0.03 (1% to 3% per annum).
In the variation of this example, suppose that instead of being a known
parameter, T is an exponentially distributed random event with hazard rate
h. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h em a x i m u mr e d u c t i o ni nt h eﬂow of utility, beginning
today, that we would accept in order to eliminate the hazard under risk






In order to make this variation comparable with the original example, sup-
pose that the expected time-to-occurrence is 1






2For T =2 0 0as before, the maximum amount that we would be willing to pay,
x0, changes by a factor of 2.3 (compared to 55 in the original formulation),
ranging from 33.3 to 14.3 as ρ ranges from 0.01 to 0.03. The ratio of







Both the level of the willingness to pay and the sensitivity of the level with
respect to the discount rate, are quite diﬀerent in these two examples, despite
their superﬁcial similarity.
With intuition based primarily on the ﬁrst version of the example, where
climate policy is very sensitive to the discount rate, many economists fo-
cused on the Stern Review’s (2006) (hereafter SR) discounting assumptions
(although others emphasized diﬀerent aspects of the report, including as-
sumptions about abatement costs and climate related damages). SR chose
aP R T Po fρ =0 .001, an elasticity of marginal utility of η =1 ,a n dag r o w t h
rate of 0.013, implying a social discount rate (SDR) of r =0 .014 (or 1.4%).
Nordhaus (2007) illustrates the importance of these discounting assump-
tions by comparing the results of three runs of the DICE model. Two of
these runs use combinations of the PRTP and η consistent with a SDR of
about 5.5%. With these values, the optimal carbon tax in the near term is
approximately $35/ton Carbon (or $9.5/ ton CO2), and the optimal level of
abatement in the near term about 14% of Business as Usual (BAU) emissions.
A third run, using the SR’s values of the PRTP and elasticity (together with
the DICE assumptions about growth) led to a carbon tax of $350/ton and a
53% level of abatement, close to the level that the SR recommends. Thus,
the carbon tax increases by a factor of 10 and abatement increases by a
factor of 53
14 =3 .8 with the decrease in the SDR. Nordhaus also describes
experiments by others that illustrate the sensitivity of optimal climate policy
to discounting assumptions.
In a diﬀerent context (focused on the eﬀect of catastrophic damages)
Nordhaus (2009) compares optimal policy under a PRTP of 0.015 and 0.001,
holding other DICE parameters (including the elasticity of marginal utility)
at their baseline levels. He reports that the reduction in PRTP increases
the optimal carbon tax from $42/tC to $102/tC. This 2.4-fold increase in
the optimal tax is much less than the 10-fold increase reported in Nordhaus
(2007), where both the PRTP and the elasticity are changed.
3Discount rate .01 .03 .05 .07
Abatement ﬁrst period (%) 25.1 9.8 5.2 3.3
Abatement 10th period (%) 18.4 8.8 5.2 3.5
Table 1: Percent reduction in emissions from BAU level
Parenthetically, the increase in the tax from $42/tC to $102/tC leads to a
fall in per capital income (during the period when it is lowest, presumably the
ﬁrst period) from $6,801 to $6,799, i.e. about 0.03%. In view of parameter
uncertainty, a 0.03% reduction in per capita income, equivalently a $15 billion
increase in aggregate abatement costs (at Gross World Product — GWP — of
$50 trillion), is close to rounding error. If it is correct that using a $102/tC
tax rather than a $42/tC tax would reduce current GWP by about $15
billion, then the criticism of the SR recommendations is that they harm future
generations, not the current generation. This may be the right interpretation
of the criticism, but it is not the one usually applied to climate policies that
are deemed “radical”. Section 3 takes up this issue.
Karp (2005) provides a diﬀerent perspective, using a linear-quadratic
model, calibrated to reﬂect abatement costs and climate-related damages
that are of the same order or magnitude as in DICE. Table 1 shows the
optimal percentage reductions in BAU emissions in the ﬁrst and the 10’th
period (100 years in the future) for diﬀerent discount rates. In this station-
ary, partial equilibrium model, there is no growth, so the pure rate of time
preference and the social discount rate are the same. However, Nordhaus’s
experiments, described above, reduce the pure rate of time preference from
1.5% to essentially 0, leading to a reduction in the social discount rate of
approximately 1.5%. Those results are therefore (roughly) comparable to
t h er e s u l t si nT a b l e1 ,w h e r et h ed i s c o u n tr a t ev a r i e sb yam a g n i t u d eo f2 %
across columns.
The lower discount rate leads to a substantially higher, but not extraordi-
narily higher level of abatement. For example, the decrease in the discount
rate from 3% to 1% increases abatement by a factor of 2.5, close to the pro-
portional increase in the optimal tax in Nordhaus (2009) when the PRTP falls
from 1.5% to 0.1%. In this linear-quadratic model, decreasing the discount
rate from 3% to 1% has approximately the same eﬀect on the near-term op-
timal policy as does tripling the level of damages corresponding to any level
of GHGs.
Fuji and Karp (2008) provide a more involved analysis of the role of dis-
4counting, still within the context of a model with a single state variable. The
SR reports values of the “output gap” resulting from climate-related dam-
ages, in eight diﬀerent periods and corresponding to three diﬀerent abatement
scenarios. Using these values, we calibrated a scalar model in which the state
variable, Pt, represents the fractional loss in income due to climate damages
and the reallocation of past resources away from standard investment and
toward climate-related measures. Our objective was to create a tractable
model that is consistent with the orders of magnitude of costs and beneﬁts in
the model underlying the SR. The control variable, xt, is the fraction of GWP
devoted to avoiding climate change, so the actual amount of consumption,
as a fraction of the amount that would have been available in the absence of
climate damage and abatement eﬀort, is (1 − Pt)(1− xt). The consumption
loss due to mitigation expenditures and remaining climate-related damage,
as a fraction of the no-damage no-control level is ∆t =1− (1 − Pt)(1− xt).
T h em o d e la l l o w sac o n s t a n tg r o w t hr a t ei ni n c o m ea n dac o n s t a n te l a s t i c i t y
utility of consumption. We used a constant annual growth rate of 1.3%, as
in the SR.
Table 2 shows optimal steady state values of the state and control vari-
ables, P and x, and the aggregate damage measure, ∆, for four combinations
of the PRTP and elasticity of marginal utility, η. With a growth rate of 1.3%,
these values encompass SDRs ranging from 1.31% to 5.6%. Because all of the
steady state values are small in absolute value, the percentage change rather
than absolute change in values is the relevant statistic. For example, with
η =1 , increasing the PRTP from 0.1% to 3% increases the fraction of steady
state expenditures (relative to available income) by about 19%. Increasing
both the PRTP and η, so that the social discount rate increases from 1.31%
to 5.6%, increases steady state expenditures x by 26%. These numbers refer
to steady state levels, whereas the numbers discussed previously consider the
abatement and tax levels in the current period or “middle future”. However,
for the calibration in Fujii and Karp (2007), the steady state values are more
sensitive to the SDR than are interim values.
I noted above that in the Nordhaus (2007) experiments, abatement in-
creases by a factor of 3.8 when the SDR falls from 5.5% to 1.4%. Because
abatement costs are convex, expenditures will increase by a larger factor. In
other words, the 26% (steady state) increase in Fujii and Karp (and lower
interim sensitivity) appears to much lower than the increase that Nordhaus
ﬁnds.
Figure 1, the graph of the steady state costs, ∆,a saf u n c t i o no fs t e a d y
5η =1 η =2
PRTP P∗ x∗ ∆ P∗ x∗ ∆
0.1% 0.0137 0.0084 0.0220 0.0147 0.0076 0.0222
3.0% 0.0165 0.0068 0.0232 0.0185 0.0062 0.0246








0.01 0.02 x               
Figure 1: The graph of steady state costs, ∆, as a function of steady state
expenditures, x
state expenditures x, provides a partial explanation for this relative lack of
sensitivity. This graph reaches a global minimum at x =0 .00845 (the op-
timal level under zero discounting) and falls rapidly for smaller values of x.
The optimal x under the SDR 1.31% nearly achieves the global minimum.
The characteristics of ∆ mean that small increases in expenditure, below the
global optimum, achieve signiﬁcant reductions in total costs. Therefore, a
very low SDR achieves nearly the global minimum, and even substantially
larger SDRs take us close to the global minimum. Because initial expendi-
tures (compared to steady state expenditures) are even less sensitive to the
SDR, the entire trajectory is “relatively insensitive” to the discount rate.
Arrow (2007) examines the eﬀect of the discount rate on our willingness
to avoid climate change, posing the question in terms of growth rates rather
than levels of damages. Although this way of presenting the tradeoﬀ is not
standard, given the state of knowledge about both climate-related damages
and abatement costs, it does not seem obviously inferior to the familiar alter-
native. Arrow considers the case where climate policy requires a sacriﬁce of
61% of the ﬂow of GWP in perpetuity. The policy eliminates climate-related
damages, leading to growth in GWP at the rate 1.4% (without damages) in-
stead of 1.3% (with damages). For a constant elasticity utility function with
η =2 , he notes that we would be willing to adopt the policy, and sacriﬁce
the 1% of GWP, provided that the PRTP is less than 8.7%. This level is
much higher than those used in all integrated assessment models, implying
that it is an easy choice to adopt this policy.
In Arrow’s experiment, GWP is higher under the climate policy at every
point in time after the ﬁrst ten years. That is, the climate policy requires
a modest sacriﬁce for a short period of time, in exchange for what eventu-
ally becomes a large increase in consumption. Perhaps this seems like a
reasonable description of climate policy to many people.
I conclude that the answer to the question posed in the title of this Sec-
tion is ambiguous. Certainly the discount rate matters, and in some settings
it matters hugely — as our intuition suggests. In other settings it appears to
matter less than we might have thought. Evidence of the sort summarized
here cannot be conclusive, because it all comes from speciﬁcm o d e l so rs p e -
ciﬁc ways of presenting the tradeoﬀ between abatement costs and avoided
damages.
3 Does climate policy require sacriﬁce?
There are two kinds of reasons that the discount rate can be important
for climate policy. Diﬀerent types of investments lead to diﬀerent proﬁles
of future beneﬁts, the comparison of which depends on the discount rate.
Therefore, the allocation of a given level of investment, across diﬀerent in-
vestment opportunities, depends on the discount rate. Also, as emphasized
in the previous section, the discount rate aﬀects the willingness of the cur-
rent generation to make sacriﬁces, i.e. investments, for future generations.
A widely held view, and the source of much of the controversy about dis-
count rates, is that taking into account the climate externality requires that
the current generation reduce its current consumption, imposing a cost on
that generation. Foley (2007) explains why this view may be incorrect, and
Rezai, Foley and Taylor (2009) (hereafter RFT) explain why the mistake may
be of practical signiﬁcance.
Consider the frontier between current and future consumption in the ab-









Figure 2: Point A: the constrained optimum with abatement set equal to
0. Point B: the BAU equilibrium. Point C: the ﬁrst best optimum with
abatement.
t h et i m eb e i n g ,i g n o r et h el e t t e r si nt h i sﬁgure.) Internalization of the cli-
mate externality opens people’s eyes to the possibility of abating, in order
to leave future generations with a cleaner environment. If society does not
internalize these damages, the only way for the current generation (the “ﬁrst
period”) to leave a bequest for future generations (the “second period”) is
to leave them a higher stock of man-made capital. By internalizing future
damages, the current generation can also beneﬁt future generations by leav-
ing them a larger environmental stock. Therefore, internalization, together
with opportunities for abatement, shifts out the consumption possibility fron-
tier, making it possible to increase consumption in both the current period
and the future (the dashed curve in Figure 2). Since climate policy makes
it possible to increase both current and future consumption, the extent of
the intergenerational conﬂict may be less and the focus of the discount rate
diﬀerent than widely thought.
The above point is important and widely understood, although sometimes
neglected in policy discussions. Nordhaus (2007), page 695, considers this
possibility. He discusses a “ﬁscal experiment” in which society reduces
8emissions and in addition1
... undertake[s] ﬁscal tax and transfer policies to maintain
the baseline consumption levels for the present (say ﬁfty years).
The optimum might have slightly lower consumption in the early
years, so the ﬁscal-policy experiment would involve both abate-
ment and ﬁscal deﬁcits and debt accumulation for some time, fol-
lowed by ﬁscal surpluses and debt repayment later. In essence,
this alternative keeps consumption the same for the present but
rearranges societal investments away from conventional capital
(structure, equipment, education and the like) to investments in
abatement of greenhouse gas emissions (in “climate capital”, so
to speak).
...The reason why the [SR’s] approach is ineﬃcient is that
it invests too much in low-yield abatement strategies too early.
After ﬁfty years, conventional capital is much reduced, while “cli-
mate capital” is only slightly increased. The eﬃcient strategy has
more investment in conventional capital at the beginning, and can
use those additional resources to invest heavily in climate capital
later on.
The second paragraph quoted makes it appear that Nordhaus’s (2007)
rejection of the SR recommendations is based on a comparison of the returns
to diﬀerent types of investment. However, the emphasis on the discount rate
in his paper, and comments about the current generation making sacriﬁces
for possibly wealthier future generations, shifts the focus to intergenerational
transfers. Regardless of his intention, much of the discussion about climate
policy amongst economists, climate scientists, and the general public, does
emphasize the cost to the current generation of internalizing climate damage.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) can measure the cost to the cur-
rent generation of optimal climate policy by comparing current consumption
under the optimal program with consumption under a baseline that does
not internalize climate change. RFT claim that some of these IAMs choose
the wrong baseline, systematically exaggerating the baseline level of current
consumption and thereby upwardly biasing the estimate of the consumption
1Nordhaus’s mention of ﬁscal deﬁcits and debt accumulation is puzzling in this con-
text. The reallocation of investment away from man-made and toward natural capital is
consistent with a decreased, increased, or unchanged debt.
9cost to the current generation that would arise from internalizing climate
damages. Based on this result, they conclude that the true cost to the cur-
rent generation (in units of foregone current consumption) of optimal policy
may be negligible.
It is worth emphasizing that the choice of the baseline used in IAMs does
not aﬀect the validity of the models’ policy recommendations. The choice
o ft h eb a s e l i n eo b v i o u s l yd o e sa ﬀect the estimated present discounted stream
of beneﬁts of optimal policy — the diﬀerence between optimal and baseline
levels; the baseline also aﬀects the comparison of optimal and Business as
Usual (BAU) current consumption, and therefore aﬀects the magnitude of
the proposed sacriﬁce to the current generation.
In order to understand this claim, consider a simple model with two state
variables, (man-made) capital stock and the stock of GHGs (natural capi-
tal). Production creates emissions, leading to higher GHG stocks and higher
environmental damages. Society can reduce current emissions by allocating
some current production to abatement, but this requires a reduction in either
current consumption or investment in man-made capital. More complicated
models, in which society can reduce future abatement costs by investing in
clean technology, do not change the intuition, so there is no advantage here
in considering such models.
The ﬁrst best optimum can be found by solving a standard optimization
problem in which a single decision-maker chooses abatement, consumption,
and investment in each period, subject to technology (the production func-
tion) and the equations of motion for capital and the GHG stock.
How should we calculate the baseline? It seems reasonable to take the
baseline as the competitive equilibrium in which decision-makers have ratio-
nal expectations but do not internalize the environmental damages. In this
BAU baseline, agents do not pretend that environmental damages do not
exist; however, they act as if their decisions have no eﬀect on these damages.
Finding this rational expectations competitive equilibrium requires ﬁnding
a trajectory of investment and consumption decisions and a corresponding
sequence of GHG stocks and environmental damages, such that the invest-
ment/consumption trajectory is a competitive equilibrium taking as given
this sequence of environmental damages. This equilibrium seems like the
most reasonable baseline; I refer to it as the BAU baseline. Finding the BAU
baseline requires solving an equilibrium problem, not a simple optimization
problem.
RFT claim that some prominent IAMs do not calculate this baseline cor-
10rectly, and that instead they merely solve an optimization problem in which
abatement is constrained to be 0 (or some other ﬁxed, non-optimal level);
call this the “constrained optimization problem”. That is, RFT claim that
these IAMs merely “turn oﬀ” the abatement control, and solve the problem
in which a decisionmaker chooses investment and consumption optimally, re-
specting the production function and the equation of motion for capital and
GHG stocks and understanding the relation between environmental stocks
and damages. This problem is a standard optimization problem, not an equi-
librium problem, but it does not have any obvious signiﬁcance. It results in
a rational expectations equilibrium, because the resulting future trajectory
of damages equals the trajectory that the decisionmaker anticipates when
choosing current consumption and investment. However, if agents really
treat climate damages as an externality, then they should not take into ac-
count how current investment alters future emissions, thereby aﬀecting future
damages.
An alternative assumes that agents ignore future damages. That alter-
native is a least consistent with the assumption that agents treat damages as
an externality. However, it does not lead to a rational expectations equilib-
rium, because agents are systematically wrong about the level of damages.
In IAMs where the climate aﬀects productivity, this error causes agents to
be systematically wrong about the return on capital.
Both the constrained optimization problem and the alternative in which
decision-makers ignore damages are unsatisfactory baselines. The ﬁrst turns
oﬀ the abatement control and the second turns oﬀ environmental damages.
The ﬁrst leads to a rational expectations equilibrium but allows the deci-
sionmaker who invests today to internalize future (although not current)
damages, leading to an internally inconsistent model. The second uses
an internally consistent model, in which agents ignore both current and fu-
ture damages, but it does not produce a rational expectations equilibrium.
Decision-makers in the ﬁrst model are “too smart” and they are “too dumb”
in the second alternative, at least according to current modeling norms.
In order to show why using the constrained optimization solution as a
baseline leads to an exaggerated estimate of the reduction in current con-
sumption required by optimal climate policy, I use a two period model. RFT
use a genuinely dynamic model calibrated to be consistent with DICE, and
they show the empirical importance of this result. My objective here is only
to provide intuition about this claim, so I use a stripped down two-period
11model.2
This model requires that I compress the dynamics in a way that appears
artiﬁcial. In particular, I assume that the emissions resulting from current
production contribute to the current GHG stocks, reducing current as well
as future output. A more descriptive model would have current emissions
caused by current production contribute to GHG stock and damages only
in the next period, but that greater degree of realism would require a three
period model.
When current capital stock is k and lagged GHG stock is S−1, and there
is no abatement, emissions are equal to F(k), so the current GHG stock
is S−1 + F(k). By choice of units, output in the current period in the
absence of climate-related damage is also F(k). Actual output in the current
period, taking into account climate damage, and excluding the possibility of
abatement, equals
Y = D(S−1 + F(k))F (k).
The function D(S) represents environmental damages, with
D(S) ≤ 1 and D
0 (S) < 0.
An increased stock of GHGs increases damages and decreases output. In
the ﬁrst period, the current capital stock, k, and lagged GHG stocks, S−1,
are predetermined. By choice of units, set
D(S−1 + F(k)) = 1 = F (k). (2)
Suppose that F(0) = 0; if the capital stock is 0, there is neither output nor
emissions.
If society abates the fraction μ of emissions, total output is
Y = D(S−1 +( 1− μ)F(k))F (k)
2The other alternative baseline, in which the decision-maker simply ignores damages
(the “too dumb” scenario), also leads to an incorrect estimate of the cost of internalizing
climate change, but the direction of the bias is ambiguous. Ignoring future damages leads
to an upwardly biased estimate of future income, thus lowering the incentive to invest in
the current period. However, ignoring future damages also leads to an upwardly biased
estimate of the marginal product of capital, thus increasing the incentive to invest in the
current period. In any case, the “too dumb” scenario is probably not as important as the
“too smart” scenario, because to my knowledge no IAM creator has been accused of using
it.
12and abatement costs are Yγ(μ),w i t hγ (0) = 0 Remaining output is allo-
cated between consumption and investment:
D(S−1 +( 1− μ)F(k)) · F (k) · (1 − γ (μ)) = c + I.
The stock of GHGs accumulates according to
S = F (k)(1− μ)+S−1,
and the stock of capital depreciates in a single period, so next period’s capital
equals the current period’s investment:
k
0 = I. (3)
The utility of current consumption is c and there is no discounting, so in
period 0 the decisionmaker wants to maximize the sum of current and future
consumption, c+c0. In the second (and last) period it is not optimal to invest
anything, since capital has no value after that period.
Consider three possible equilibria.
(i) In the ﬁrst best equilibrium, agents choose consumption,
abatement, and investment in the ﬁrst period, and consumption
and abatement in the second period. They take into account
the income constraints in the two periods and the equations of
motion.
(ii) The constrained optimal equilibrium represents the case
where agents are constrained to set abatement equal to 0, but
they understand that investment in the current period increases
damages in the second period, via the increase in second period
emissions F(k0).
(iii) In the BAU equilibrium, agents take aggregate emission
and the trajectory of damages as exogenous. Since they take
emissions as exogenous, they have no reason to abate, so μ =0 .
B u ta l s o ,s i n c et h e yt a k ee m i s s i o n sa se x o g e n o u s ,t h e yd on o t
take into account the fact that ﬁrst period investment increases
second period emissions and damages, a fact that reduces second
period consumption. That is, in the BAU equilibrium agents
overstate the marginal value of investment.
13In both the BAU and the constrained optimal equilibrium μ =0in both
periods; this equality and equation (2) imply c = Y (1 − γ (μ)) − I =1− I.







where the underlined term is the additional second period emissions due to
ﬁrst period investment. The maximand for the constrained optimal program
is 1−I+c2. I assume that c2 is concave in I so that the ﬁrst order condition









where the argument of the damage function in the second period is
S = S−1 + F (k)+F(I)=S−1 +1+F(I). (5)
The presence of the underlined term in this ﬁrst order condition shows that
in the constrained optimal equilibrium, the current generation internalizes
future damages. They do not abate current emissions, but in choosing
c u r r e n ti n v e s t m e n tt h e yr e c o g n i z et h a th i g h e rc a p i t a li nt h en e x tp e r i o dl e a d s
to increased damages.
In the BAU equilibrium, agents take next period damages as given, so
the ﬁrst order condition for investment is
1=[ D(·)]F
0 (I).





0 (I) < 0
and the second order conditions to the optimization problems imply that
investment is lower, and therefore ﬁrst period consumption is higher, in the
constrained optimal equilibrium, relative to the BAU equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows the graph of c2 as a function of c1 when abatement is
constrained to 0, the solid curve. The constrained optimum is point A and
the BAU equilibrium is point B. As noted above, the constrained optimum
involves higher ﬁrst period consumption, in order to reduce future damage,
compared to the BAU level. The dashed curve shows the graph of second
14period consumption as a function of ﬁrst period consumption, when the de-
cisionmaker chooses abatement optimally. The with-abatement frontier lies
outside the no-abatement feasible set.
In the ﬁrst-best optimum, when the decisionmaker chooses both ﬁrst pe-
riod investment, I, and abatement in the two periods, μ and μ0,t h em a x i -
mand is (using F (k)=1 )
[Y · (1 − γ (μ)) − I]+[ D(S−1 +1− γ (μ)+( 1− γ (μ
0))F (I))F(I)],
where the two bracketed terms are ﬁrst and second period consumption. The
ﬁrst order condition for investment is
1=[ D
0 (·)(1− γ (μ
0))F (I)+D(·)]F
0 (I), (6)
where the argument of the damage function is now
S











rather than the level in equation (5)
The right sides of both equations (4) and (6) are decreasing in I by the
second order condition. In any reasonable equilibrium, Sopt is less than the
level under the constrained optimum. If that relation holds and if damages
are linear (D00 ≡ 0), then the graph (as a function of I)o ft h er i g h ts i d eo f
(4) lies below the graph of the right side of (6). In this case, (using the fact
that in general μopt > 0) investment in both man-made and natural capital
is higher in the ﬁrst best compared to the constrained optimum.3 However,
in view of the relation between investment in the constrained optimum and
in BAU, investment in man-made capital under BAU can be higher than
in the ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m e . I nt h a tc a s e ,t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi n v o l v e sl e s s
investment in man-made capital and more investment in natural capital (μ>
0) relative to BAU. Figure 2 shows a situation where ﬁrst period consumption
is approximately the same under BAU and under the ﬁrst best, although
clearly the relation is ambiguous in general.
RFT calibrate a model with natural and man-made capital, using abate-
ment costs and environmental damages similar to those in DICE. A major
point of their exercise is to show that using the constrained optimum instead
of BAU as the baseline greatly exaggerates the cost to the current generation
(in terms of foregone current consumption) of behaving optimally.
3This result could be overturned if utility were non-linear in consumption.
15IAMs emphasize the eﬀect of optimal policy on the change in the present
discounted value of the stream of future utility, rather than the change in
the proﬁle of consumption (or welfare). For this reason, it might appear
that RFT have set up a straw man. I disagree with that judgement for
two reasons. First, there is a widespread perception that protecting future
generations from climate change requires reductions in consumption in the
near term. The perception may be wrong, or at least exaggerated, and it is
worth demonstrating that this is so in a model that makes assumptions about
damages and abatement costs similar to those used by prominent IAMs.
Second, when IAMs use the constrained optimum rather than BAU as the
baseline, they understate the increase in the present discounted ﬂow of welfare
arising from optimal climate policy. This point is also worth making clearly.
4 Do catastrophes swamp discounting?
Weitzman (2008) examines the eﬀect of parameter uncertainty on the social
discount rate. Using a two period model, representing the current period
and the distant future, he calculates the marginal expected value of transfer-
ring the ﬁrst unit of certain consumption from the present into an uncertain
future. His chief result is open to several interpretations. In my view, a
“modest” interpretation is correct and useful. A controversial interpreta-
tion is that the result undermines our ability to sensibly apply cost-beneﬁt
analysis to situations where there is uncertainty about catastrophic events.
A “corollary” to this interpretation is that the recognition of catastrophic
events makes discounting a second order issue. I think that both the con-
troversial interpretation and the corollary to it are incorrect.
In order to explain these points, I consider a simpliﬁed version of his
model. Let c be the known current consumption, c0 the random future con-
sumption, x the number of certain units of consumption transferred from the
current period to the future, β the discount factor (representing the pure rate
of time preference), and u the utility of consumption. The social discount
factor for consumption, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between “the










16The chief result is that, under the assumptions of the model, Γ = ∞;W e i t z -
man dubs this result “the dismal theorem”.
The model includes a number of important features, including: (i) the
uncertainty about c0 is such that there is a “signiﬁcant” probability that its
realization is 0; (ii) the marginal utility of consumption at c0 =0is inﬁnite;
and (iii) it is possible to transfer a certain unit of consumption into the
future. Features (ii) and (iii) are assumptions, but (i) is a result of the
model; most of the modeling eﬀort goes to constructing a setting that yields
this feature. Weitzman achieves this by assuming that the variance of c0 is an
unknown parameter, and the decisionmaker’s subjective distribution for this
parameter has “fat tails”; roughly speaking, this means that the probability
of extreme values of the variance does not approach 0 “too quickly”. As
applied to the problem of climate change, all three features of the model, and
especially (i) and (ii), have been criticized. Although there is tremendous
uncertainty about the eﬀects of climate change, some modelers feel that it
is reasonable to bound the possible damages away from levels that would
result in consumption at a level where the marginal utility is inﬁnite, or even
enormously large.
Those criticisms are important, but a more fundamental issue is how to
interpret the dismal theorem. A modest interpretation is that uncertainty
about the distribution of a random variable can signiﬁcantly increase “over-
all uncertainty” about this random variable, leading to a much higher risk
premium (and therefore a much higher willingness to transfer consumption
from the present into the future) relative to the situation where the distri-
bution of the random variable is known. This modest interpretation is not
controversial.
An extreme interpretation is that under conditions where the dismal the-
orem holds, society should be willing to make essentially any sacriﬁce to
transfer a unit of certain consumption into the future. That interpretation
is also not controversial, because it is so obviously wrong. Even with 0 dis-
counting (in this two period stationary model with the same utility function
in both periods), we would never be willing to transfer to the future more
than half of what we currently have.
The controversial interpretation is that the dismal theorem substantially
undermines our ability to sensibly apply cost-beneﬁt analysis to situations
with “deep uncertainty” about catastrophic risks. The basis for this claim is
that in order to use the social discount rate given in equation (8), we need to
modify the model so that Γ is ﬁnite. Weitzman suggests ways of doing this,
17such as truncating a distribution or changing an assumption about the utility
function or its argument, in order to make Γ ﬁnite. The alleged problem
is that the resulting Γ is extremely sensitive to the particular device that
we use to render it ﬁnite. Because we do not have a consensus about how
to achieve this ﬁnite value, we do not have a good way to select from the
many extremely large and possibly very diﬀerent social discount rates. In
this setting, it is diﬃcult to use cost-beneﬁt analysis.
This controversial interpretation is not persuasive. Horowitz and Lange
(2008) identify clearly the nub of the misunderstanding; I rephrase their
explanation. Nordhaus (2008) also identiﬁes this issue, and he provides
numerical results using DICE to illustrate how cost-beneﬁta n a l y s i sc a nb e
used even when damages are extremely large.4
The problem with the controversial interpretation is that the value of Γ
in equation (8) is essentially irrelevant for cost beneﬁt analysis. This expres-
sion, which is evaluated at x =0 , gives the value of the “ﬁrst” marginal unit
transferred. The fact that the derivative may be inﬁnite does not, of course,
imply that the value of transferring one (non-inﬁnitesimal) unit of sure con-
sumption is inﬁnite. If we want to approximate the value of a function, it
makes no sense to use a Taylor approximation evaluated where that func-
tion’s ﬁrst derivative is inﬁnite. We would make (essentially) this mistake if
we were to use equation (8) as a basis for cost-beneﬁt analysis with climate
policy. The value of the derivative evaluated at x =0is almost irrelevant for
cost-beneﬁt analysis of climate policy. The only information that we obtain
by learning that the derivative is inﬁnite is that a non-inﬁnitesimal policy
response must be optimal. This fact is worth knowing, but it obviously does
not create problems for using cost-beneﬁt analysis.
Although I think that the controversial interpretation is unsound, it has
a “corollary” that is not so easy to dismiss. This corollary states that
catastrophic risks swamps the eﬀe c to ft h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e . T h e
idea is that since the expectation of the term in parenthesis in equation (8)
is so large, the magnitude of β, and thus of the pure rate of time preference,
is relatively unimportant. Nordhaus (2009), despite his criticism of the
4These numerical results are interesting, but someone who accepts the controversial in-
terpretation of the dismal theorem will not regard them as a convincing counter-argument
to that interpretation. All of the numerical experiments arise in a deterministic context,
and in that respect they do not really confront the dismal theorem, which makes sense
only in a setting with risk and uncertainty (Weitzman 2009). For this reason, I think that
Horowitz and Lange’s very simple treatment of the problem is particularly helpful.
18controversial interpretation of the dismal theorem, endorses this view:
...discounting is a second-order issue in the context of catastrophic
outcomes. ... If the future outlook is indeed catastrophic, that
is understood, and policies are undertaken, the discount rate has
little eﬀect on the estimate of the social cost of carbon or to the
optimal mitigation policy.
(Emphasis added.) Presumably this judgement derives from numerical ex-
periments with DICE, but Nordhaus does not provide evidence to support
his assertion; the only reported comparison involving discounting holds other
DICE parameters at their baseline level, i.e. at levels not consistent with
catastrophic damages.
T h i sc o r o l l a r ym a yh o l di ns p e c i ﬁc settings, but it would be surprising if
it is a general feature of catastrophic risk. The magnitude of the expectation
of the term in parenthesis in equation (8), evaluated at x =0 , can certainly
swamp the magnitude of β;b u tIh a v ej u s tn o t e dt h a tt h ef o r m e rt e r mi s
irrelevant for cost-beneﬁt analysis (beyond telling us that non-inﬁnitesimal
policy is optimal).
In order to get a sense of whether the corollary is likely to hold, and also
to illustrate why the controversial interpretation of the dismal theorem is not
persuasive, I use an example with u = c1−η
1−η .S e t β =e x p ( −ρT) and choose
a unit of time equal to a century. With this choice of units, ρ is the annual
pure rate of time preference expressed as a percent. Suppose that c0 takes
the value c with probability 1 − p and the value 0 with probability p.F o r
p>0 the right side of equation (8) is inﬁnite, as in the dismal theorem. The
optimization problem is
max
x (u(c − x)+β [(1 − p)u(c + x)+pu(x)]).
Normalize by setting c =1 ,s ot h a tx equals the fraction of current consump-
tion that we transfer into the future. With a bit of manipulation, the ﬁrst

















Using η =2and T =1(so that the “future” is a century from now),
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Figure 3: The relation between the transfer, x, and the annual percentage
discount rate, ρ,f o rp =0 .05 (dashed), p =0 .1 (solid) and p =0 .2 (dotted),
with η =2 .
preference, ρ, and the optimal value of x for p equal to 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2.
The ﬁgure illustrates the obvious point that the fact that the expression
in equation (8) is inﬁnite does not cause any problem in determining an
optimal value of the transfer. It also illustrates the not-so-obvious point that
catastrophic risk does not swamp the eﬀect of discounting, in determining
the optimal level of the transfer. Changes in p have an eﬀect on the optimal
x that appear to be of the same order of magnitude as changes in ρ.
W eg e tab i tm o r ei n s i g h ti n t ot h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eP R T P ,ρ,
and the probability of catastrophe, p, by taking ratio of the elasticities of
the optimal x with respect to these variables. Deﬁne the elasticities and the














For τ>1,xis more sensitive to discounting than to the probability of
catastrophe, and the reverse holds for τ<1. Tedious calculation shows that
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20where x = x(ρ,p,T) is deﬁned implicitly by equation (9). The ratio of
elasticities depends explicitly on p and x and it depends implicitly on T,
because that variable aﬀects the optimal value of x.
Continuing the example, set p =0 .05: the probability that in one century
consumption (absent the transfer) falls to 0,equals 0.05. Figure 4 shows the
graph of τ for x(ρ,p,T) ∈ [0.13,0.21] with η =2and p =0 .05. With these
parameter values (and T =1century), x =0 .13 is the optimal transfer to
the future when the annualized PRTP is 1%, and x =0 .21 is the optimal
transfer when the annualized PRTP is 0.1%.
There is not a general agreement about the “reasonable” level of the
PRTP. I think that a 3% rate would be widely regarded as a high value, 1%
as a moderate or low value, and 0.1% (the value used in the SR) as a very low
value. Therefore, consideration of the interval x(ρ,p,T) ∈ [0.13,0.21] means
that we are (implicitly) considering moderately low to very low PRTPs. Over
this interval of x, τ ranges (inversely) over [0.16,1.27]; in addition, τ ≥ 1 for
x ≤ 0.15,o re q u i v a l e n t l yρ ≥ 0.74. (It is worth reminding the reader that
due to the choice of time units, ρ is the annualized PRTP expressed as a
percent.)
In summary, for the example with p =0 .05, η =2 ,a n dT =1 ,t h eo p t i m a l
transfer is more sensitive to the PRTP than to the probability of catastrophe
(τ>1), whenever the PRTP exceeds an annualized level of 0.74%. Readers
who think that PRTPs in excess of 0.74% include the range of reasonable
rates, would conclude that for this example, the optimal transfer is more
sensitive to the discount rate than to the probability of catastrophe.
The lowest value of τ in this experiment, corresponding to ρ =0 .1,i s
0.16. Thus, for extremely low discount rates, the optimal transfer is 1
.16 =6 .
25 times more sensitive to the probability of catastrophe than to the discount
rate. As ρ → 0,t h eo p t i m a lt r a n s f e rx → 0.222,a n da sx → 0.222, τ → 0.
That is, for PRTPs arbitrarily close to 0, 1
τ becomes arbitrarily large.
Therefore, there is a situation (extremely low ρ) where consideration of the
risk of catastrophe does swamp discounting. However, this situation is
rather trivial, and we do not need a speciﬁc model, such as I have used here,
to recognize it. In any two-period, or ﬁnite horizon setting, the optimal
transfer from the present to the future is bounded above; for example, in
the two period setting we obviously would never transfer more than half
of current consumption, whatever the discount rate or the probability of
catastrophe. For a given probability of catastrophe, the optimal transfer
reaches its maximum at ρ =0(under the assumption that ρ ≥ 0). Therefore,








Figure 4: The ratio of elasticities, τ, as a function of x for η =2and p =0 .05.
for ρ extremely close to 0, the elasticity of the transfer with respect to ρ must
approach 0, so τ must approach 0. In other words, the comparative statics
question that this experiment addresses is interesting only for ρ bounded
away from 0.
5 How do we view the distant future?
Here I discuss whether hyperbolic discounting provides a reasonable model
of how people view the world, and then I discuss some implications of my
answer. The major eﬀects of today’s GHG emissions might occur decades
or even centuries in the future. Therefore, the evaluation of future welfare
is likely to matter to climate policy. The Ramsey formula for the social
discount rate adopts the perspective of an inﬁnitely-lived agent who has a
constant pure rate of time preference. The absence, in the real world, of
ﬁnancial markets that make it possible to directly transfer a unit of con-
sumption from today into any point in the future, is not important. The
agent today can indirectly transfer consumption into any point in the future
simply by making a succession of one-period transfers. The absence of these
long-term ﬁnancial markets may matter if the agent has time-inconsistent
preferences, such as arise with a non-constant, e.g. hyperbolic, pure rate of
time preference.
T h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c em e a s u r e so u rw i l l i n g n e s st ot a k eu t i l i t y
away from a future generation in order to increase the utility of an earlier
22generation. This measure plausibly depends on our ability to make distinc-
tions among diﬀerent generations. Based on introspection, I think that we
are better able to distinguish among people who are closer to us, either in
space, time, or genetically, compared to people who are further from us. If
this view is correct, then we discount hyperbolically, not at a constant rate.
Ramsey (1928) remarked “My picture of the world is drawn in perspec-
tive. ... I apply my perspective not merely to space but also to time.”
Perspective applied to space means that objects further in the distance ap-
pear smaller. In this regard, perspective applied to space is analogous to
discounting applied to time: events further in the future appear less signiﬁ-
cant. It is perhaps not obvious that perspective applied to space is analogous
to hyperbolic discounting.
I use an extremely simple example to support this claim. Figure 5 is a
drawing of a railroad in one-point perspective. The rails, which are parallel
in reality, appear to converge at the horizon. The horizontal lines, the
railroad ties, are actually evenly spaced, but more distant ties appear to be
closer together. The letters A,B,C... denote the successive ties, and also
the apparent length of the ties. Although the actual lengths are equal,
the apparent lengths diminish: A>B>C . . ..T h el e t t e r sa,b,c... denote
the apparent distance between ties. The person looking at this railroad is
standing in front of the ﬁrst tie, A. If this person were ubiquitous, she would
correctly perceive the rails to be parallel and the ties to be evenly spaced.
Since she is located in a particular position, the rails appear to converge and
the ties to get closer together in the distance. The taller she is, the more
her view resembles that of the ﬂoating deity.
There are two equivalent interpretations of hyperbolic discounting in this
context. One interpretation is that the apparent rate of decrease of the
distance between ties falls as the ties become further away from the person.
This interpretation is analogous to the idea that the interval of time, say a
year, seems smaller further in the future. For example, delaying an event
for a year, starting today, may seem more signiﬁcant that delaying an event
from 500 years to 501 years from now. The second interpretation is that
the rate of decrease of the apparent length of the ties falls as the ties become
more distant. This interpretation is analogous to the idea that exchanging
a dollar today for a dollar one year from now appears to involve a greater












Figure 5: A railroad drawn in one-point perspective. The sides of the trape-
zoid (the rails) are parallel in reality, and the horizontal lines (the railroad
ties) are evenly spaced in reality.
Deﬁnition 1. A person with one-point perspective has hyperbolic discounting














These two inequalities correspond to the ﬁrst and the second interpreta-
tions described above. More precisely, inequalities such as these must apply
for any three successive distances, not simply for the ﬁrst three as shown. I
express Deﬁnition 1 using the ﬁrst three distances only to conserve notation.
Proposition 1. A person with one-point perspective has hyperbolic discount-
ing with respect to space.
We do not give a second thought to our perception of space. If one accepts
Ramsey’s analogy between space and time, then the recognition that our
spatial perspective is hyperbolic makes it easier accept that our temporal
perspective is also hyperbolic. I provide this proposition in order to help
make hyperbolic discounting seem like an obvious, not an esoteric choice.
Does hyperbolic discounting matter? There are two steps to answering
this question. I ﬁrst discuss how hyperbolic discounting aﬀects the way that
we think about problems, and then I discuss how it aﬀects the trade-oﬀsw e
are willing to make for climate policy.
24There are a number of ways that we might think of the equilibrium in a
problem with hyperbolic discounting, but two choices stand out. First, we
might consider the case where the decision-maker at time 0 can commit to
future policies. This choice solves the time consistency problem by assuming
it away. It strikes me as an unappealing choice in the case where climate
policy unfolds over diﬀerent generations. The current decision-maker has
limited ability to inﬂuence her successor, except by aﬀecting the state of
the world that the successor inherits. The second alternative is to model
the equilibrium as the outcome to a sequential game amongst a succession of
policymakers. Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of equilibrium exist. A particular choice,
the Markov Perfect equilibrium, assumes that decisionmakers condition their
actions on only the directly payoﬀ relevant state variables, such as the stock
of GHG and the stock of abatement capital.
A frequent question is whether the Markov Perfect equilibrium (set) is
positive or normative. It shares features of both. Insofar as it is an outcome
to a game, rather than a single-agent optimization problem (and insofar as
we think that the model is descriptive of the real world), it is positive. In
another respect it is normative, because models of this sort typically assume
a single decisionmaker in each generation. That is, they assume that the
intra-generational problem has been solved, in order to focus on a the inter-
generational problems. A more genuinely positive model would include
both intra- and inter-generational games; but the “positive” (or predictive)
characteristic of such a model would still depend on the extent to which we
think it is descriptive.
Turning to the second part of the question, in some but not all circum-
stances hyperbolic discounting (using a Markov Perfect equilibrium) has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on policy prescriptions. Section 2 notes that in some case
the policy prescription is not very sensitive to the pure rate of time prefer-
ence. This is the case in Fujii and Karp (2008), and there the distinction
between constant and hyperbolic discounting is also not very important. In
the linear-quadratic model (Karp, 2005) I found the optimal policy to be
quite sensitive to the pure rate of time preference; there, hyperbolic dis-
counting can be quite signiﬁcant to policy. Karp and Tsur (2008) study
a model with event uncertainty, where the hazard rate increases over time
unless the decisionmaker incurs a cost to stabilize (but not eliminate) the
hazard. Equation (1) shows how the hazard rate aﬀects the risk premium
in the case of a constant hazard and constant discounting. For rare events,
the hazard rate is likely to be of a smaller order of magnitude than familiar
25levels of constant pure rates of time preference. In these cases, the equation
shows that the risk premium is likely to be small. The formula for the risk
premium is considerably more complicated when both the hazard rate and
t h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea r en o n-constant; in these cases the risk
premium can be large. Thus, this model provides an example of a situation
where hyperbolic discounting is potentially very signiﬁcant.
In the Ramsey model, the social discount rate equals ρ + ηg,w h e r eρ,
η and g are, respectively, the pure rate of time preference, the elasticity of
marginal utility, and the growth rate of consumption. If one adopts a very
small value of ρ, as in the SR, allowing this parameter to change over time is
not going to aﬀect the outcome much. Similarly, if ηg is large, for whatever
reason, a changing pure rate of time preference does not matter much.
I think that at much of the disagreement over the optimal level of climate
policy has to do with diﬀerent views about the value of g, and about long
run developments in technology more generally. If we are reasonably con-
ﬁdent that per capita income will continue to grow and that technological
advances will make abatement cheaper, and if we are not concerned that fu-
ture generations will have the same temptation to delay costly actions that we
(possibly) face, and if we are not worried about walking oﬀ a climate-related
cliﬀ, then the advice to phase in climate policy gradually (the “policy ramp”)
has considerable appeal.
6W h a t n e x t ?
If I knew the answer to that question, I would be working on that project
rather than writing a “synthesis paper”. Instead, I will take this opportunity
to recommend two lines of enquiry that I think are creative and which oﬀer
the possibility of new insights about climate policy.
Most of our models use a single composite consumption good, and assume
that climate damage reduces the productivity of man-made capital. An
alternative recognizes that natural capital and man-made capital provide
services that are imperfectly substitutable in production, consumption, or
both. Hoel and Sterner (2007) lay the groundwork in analyzing this more
complicated model; Sterner and Persson (2008) provide numerical evidence of
the importance of the model with diﬀerent types of capital. Traeger (2008)
analyzes the role of the diﬀerent stocks in determining social discount rates
and relates the results to models of sustainability.
26Most of our models assume that our objective is to maximize the expec-
tation of the discounted sum of welfare in the current and future periods.
Traeger (2009) develops the concept of intertemporal risk aversion, which
has a simple explanation. Suppose that an agent is indiﬀerent between two
(nonconstant) consumption streams, X =( x1,x 2,...xn) and Y =( y1,y 2...yn).
Denote Zmax and Zmin, as, respectively, the consumption sequences created
by taking, element by element, the larger (respectively, the smaller) of the
values of xi and yi. This agent is intertemporally risk averse if and only if she
prefers X (or the welfare-equivalent Y ) compared to obtaining Zmax or Zmin
with equal probability. In the former case she experiences some good and
some bad periods, and with the lottery she experiences only good or only bad
periods. The usual type of dynamic model, which assumes additively sep-
arable utility across periods, implies intertemporal risk neutrality. Traeger
(2009) shows that intertemporal risk aversion can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the social discount rate; he also discusses the relation between intertempo-
ral risk aversion and ambiguity aversion (arising when the distribution of a
random variable is not known). Ha-Duong and Triech (2004) illustrate the
importance of a non-additively separable model in setting climate change
policy.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The paper makes four main points:
• The sensitivity of optimal climate policy to discounting assumptions
is model-speciﬁc. Except for very simple models, we do not have a
good basis for intuition about the circumstances that make discounting
(very) important.
• The likelihood of intra-generational conﬂict arising from optimal cli-
mate policy may be exaggerated under two circumstances: (i) if we fail
to recognize that we can internalize climate damages by changing the
composition of investment between man-made and natural capital, or
(ii) if we fail to recognize that the correct business-as-usual baseline in-
volves investment decisions that internalize neither future nor current
damages.
• Uncertainty about catastrophic events might cause the present value of
the marginal utility of the ﬁrst “sure unit” of consumption transferred
27from today, into the future, to be inﬁnite. This observation does not
mean that uncertainty about catastrophic events creates a fundamen-
tally new complication in sensibly applying cost-beneﬁta n a l y s i st ot h e
question of climate policy. Neither does it imply that standard dis-
counting is a second order issue, in comparison to the uncertainty about
catastrophes.
• O n e - p o i n ts p a t i a lp e r s p e c t i v em e a n sn o to n l yt h a td i s t a n to b j e c t sa p -
pear smaller, but also that the rate of decrease of apparent size falls with
increased distance: our ability to distinguish between distant objects
diminishes with distance. If one accepts Ramsey’s analogy between
perspective in space and in time, then our “natural” way of viewing
the distant future involves hyperbolic rather than constant discounting.
Hyperbolic discounting requires that we think about climate policy as
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If the two parallel segments of a trapezoid have length A and E,a s
shown in Figure 5,and the distance between them (the height of the trape-










is y, then the height of the intersection of the principal diagonals is (using













Normalize by setting the height of the large trapezoid in Figure 5 equal
to 1: H =1 . Using equation (11) I have












Using equation (12) in equation (10) I have














Using equations (13) and (12) in equation (11) I have















Equations (12) and (14) imply




















In o wu s ee q u a t i o n( 1 2 )t ow r i t e






















3A2 +4 AE + E2. (17)




























thus establishing inequality (i) in Deﬁnition 1.
To establish inequality (ii) in the Deﬁnition, use equations (10) and (14)
to obtain.
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